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LEGISLATION BY THE COURTS
It is remarkable that in this second century of the republic
our courts should be so vehemently assailed for interference in
legislation. One who knew of our duplex governments only by
study of their written constitutions would open his eyes when
told that there is any such thing under them as legislation by
the courts. The citizen of Nebraska lives under a constitution
which devotes an entire article to declaring, not only that the
executive, legislative, and judicial departments of its state
government are and must be kept distinct, but that no person
in anyone of them, except as specially authorised, shall exercise
powers properly belonging to another department. The federal
constitution does not go quite so far. It merely provides that
" all legislative power" shall be vested in Congress, "the executive
power" in a President, and "the judicial power" in one supreme
court and such inferior ones as Congress shall provide, each in a
separate article of that venerated instrument.
The first of state constitutions, the one with which the colony
of New Hampshire started out in March, 1776, was too brief
and provisional to do much more than simply to provide a new
executive on the" sudden and abrupt departure of his Excellency,
John Wentworth, Esq., our late governor." The other institutions of the colony were left pretty much as they were and no
mention was then made of the courts. But when the good citizens of that colony found as one of the results of Governor
Wentworth's "abrupt and sudden departure" that they were
wholly freed from any danger of his return or of the coming of
any other royal successor, they proceeded to make a constitution
which was a real instrument of government, and not a mere
provisional arrangement formed on the recommendation of the
Continental Congress "to secure peace and good order during
the continuance of the dispute with Great Britain."
In that constitution of 1784 we find: "In the government of
this state, the three essential powers thereof, to-wit, the legislative, executive, and judicial, ought to be kept as separate from
and independent of each other as the nature of a free government
will admit or as is consistent with that chain of connection that
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binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble
bond of union and amity." It is clear that when our constitution making began in 1776 Montesquieu's doctrine that such a
separation of the three great powers was necessary to the preservation of liberty was, on paper at least, fully accepted. The
Virginia constitution of June, 1776, declared: "The legislative,
executive, and judiciary departments shall be separate and
distinct so that neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to the other; nor shall any person exercise the powers of more
than one of them at the same time; except that justices of the
county courts shall be eligible to either house of the assembly."
Something of the same kind, often in identical or equivalent
phrases, exists in all the original constitutions prepared under
the suggestion of the Continental Congress, which had recommended the form of state governments and "the suppression
of English royal authority" as early as November 4, 1775.
Not only did these constitutions contain such a declaration
of intention to keep the powers separate, but nearly all of them
contained a clause that reads as if it were specially aimed at an
authority since then universally asserted by and allowed to our
courts, that of declaring laws void because unconstitutional.
The Virginia declaration of rights of June 12, 1776, declares:
"All power of suspending laws or the execution of laws by any
authority without consent of the representatives of the people
is injurious to their rights and ought not to be exercised."
Unquestionably this was in fact intended to assail the authorityof the English crown and of a parliament in which the colonists were not represented, to change fundamentally the legal
system under which the colonies had been formed. It reads,
however, precisely as if intended to forbid the voiding of laws
by the courts, whether for unconstitutionality or other reason.
Such an interpretation is further suggested by the declaration
just preceding: " The legislative and executive powers of the
state should be separate and distinct from the judiciary, and that
the members of the two first may be restrained from oppression
. by feeling and participating the burdens of the people, they should
at fixed periods be reduced into that body from which they were
originally taken and the vacancies supplied by frequent, certain,
and regular elections--." The election of a fresh legislature
to repeal, not a court to annul, is the suggested remedy for
wrongful legislation.
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Notwithstanding all this, as fast as the question arose for
determination in the states, and in Virginia itself before I7 87,
their highest courts determined that their constitutions were
laws, supreme laws, to be interpreted by the courts whenever
a litigant's personal or property rights were involved, and so
the courts were converted into a means of "suspending" acts
passed by the legislature. They did this with the entire approval
of the mass of the citizens in all the commonwealths.
Probably the fact that at the outbreak of the dispute with
Great Britain the constitutionality and therefore the validity
of the acts of parliament providing for the so-called writs of
assistance had been vehemently assailed by Otis before the
Massachusetts judges, and the further fact that the revolution
itself had been brought on in resistance to parliament rather
than as rebellion against King George, made the colonists more
ready to apply English precedents of successful use of legal rules
against royal authority to the voiding of legislative acts. At
any rate, wherever the question had arisen in the colonies before
the Federal Constitutional Convention, the courts had sustained
their own authority to interpret the provisions of the constitutions and had asserted the invalidity, as against private rights,
of all legislation which was found to be clearly contrary to such
provisions.
The view as to this matter which was current when the federal
constitution was under consideration, sufficiently appears in The
Federalist, No. 78.
Perhaps the most notable thing about that paper is Hamilton's skill in putting himself and his associates on the popular
side. He shows that the judiciary are the least dangerous of
governmental functionaries. They hold neither the sword nor
the purse. The first is in the hands of the President; the second
in those of Congress. The judiciary have only judgment and
must depend on the executive ann for the enforcement of that.
Farther on he calls attention to the fact that if he and his associates are insisting that the courts shall assert the provisions of
the constitution against an act of the legislature even if supported
by a majority of the people themselves as well as of the legislature,
the supporters of the new constitution are not like their opponents
denying the people's right to make changes or abolish their own
constitution. "But it is easy to see that it would require an
uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as
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faithful guardians of the constitution where the legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of the community," he adds. He contends that the possessing of this
power by the courts does not show any superiority of the courts
to the legislatures, but only the superiority of the people to both.
In answer to the assertion that the judges would be given
the opportunity to substitute their own will for the constitutionally expressed will of the legislature in holding the act bad
when they merely disliked the legislation, he replies that such
an opportunity always occurs when a matter is left to a court
to decide; but that all experience shows that intentional and
serious departures, on the part of the courts, from any clear
rule of law are very rare. He might have added that the logical
development of any rule in the process of applying it to new and
unforeseen occasions inevitably lays over it a line of ever-widening glosses. This process is so inevitably necessary that it is
safe to say that no great legal system ever developed without
a great court. Such systems have been made with small help
from legislation. English law is the work of English judges of
whose labours we inherit the result. Of the civil law of Rome,
which divides with English law the sway of the globe, is it the
prretor's edict or the fragments of legislation by comitia and
senate which furnish the backbone?
The English courts backed by their royal organisers first
created the body of common law. They had it well under way
before parliaments began. Then they added with royal assistance and approval the stately jurisdiction of equity. This latter
was well advanced when they took up the law merchant and its
rules and made that, too, a part of their polity. Still parliament
was occupied with politics and administration and had given
small attention to legislation. It had, however, discovered by
this time that such a great instrument of authority could no
longer be safely left wholly with the king. In providing for his
successors by the act of settlement, though leaving the power of
appointment with the king, they made the judge's office one for
life subject to removal on a joint resolution of the two houses of
parliament.
The non-exercise of this power during almost a hundred years
seems to have caused it to have been ignored by the constitutionmakers at Philadelphia in 1787. It seems not to have been mentioned in their deliberations, though it is referred to by Madison
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in The Federalist and had been inserted in the l\1assachusetts
constitution of 1780. There it has been carried in reserve, like
the extra tire of an automobile, without once coming into use
from that day to this. So completely has it been forgotten that
the current agitation as to the recall has scarcely brought it into
view.
With such a history of their judicial ancestry behind them,
brought into existence by the colonial struggle' against parliament, supported by the overflowing individualism of current
public sentiment as well as by the complete success of the new
state constitutions in their field of local government, the assertion of the judicial power to pass on the constitutionality of
legislation was inevitable. For years no attempt was made to
answer Hamilton's question-begging proposition that such a
power is inseparable from written limitations on powers of
government.
Indeed, it was apparently not foreseen even by Hamilton
what a potent instrument towards fashioning legislation it could
be made and was destined to become. Blackstone's notion that
the common law had been perfected and was entirely adequate
to the needs of society, that most of it had come down from time
immemorial, and with the slight changes he suggested would
remain intact and sufficient for still longer ages to come, seems
to have been pretty generally the view held in those days and
shared in even by the writers of The Federalist. They affirmed
in No. 62 of that work that "facility and excess of law-making
seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most
liable." In No. 48 Madison quotes Jefferson's Notes on Virginia
to show that experience in that state evinced encroachments by
the legislature on the domain of the judiciary, "and the direction
of the executive during the whole time of their session is becoming
habitual and familiar." With such feelings toward legislatures,
the constitution-makers naturally relied upon the courts to
maintain that natural law of property which the constitutions
recognised. The courts did not disappoint them, but assumed
the new jurisdiction with all alacrity and have sometimes pushed
it beyond bounds.
Of course, it was after all only an extension of the task of
interpretation and application by which from time immemorial
the courts have built up legal systems. The modem legislator,
to be sure, finds his best intentions thwarted by unsympathetic
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courts which say that his employer's liability law interferes with
the constitutional rights of the employed to sell his labour on
his own terms; or which declare the combination in restraint of
interstate traq.e which his law punishes can only be the unreasonably restrictive combination which common law pronounces
illegal. His most ancient brother, however, had similar troubles.
Solon himself, says Plutarch, was so troubled by those who
called upon him for interpretations of his code that he sailed
away for ten years to permit his fellow-citizens, who had sworn
to observe it for a hundred years, time to get used to its provisions before his return. His troubles on that score were not
renewed. His laws were too far gone in abeyance when he came
back. Aristotle tells us that equity must be resorted to in order
that those things wherein the enacted law fails because of its
too great generality may be corrected in the individual cases.
Did not Justinian forbid any commentary on his code and find
the prohibition vain? Did not Napoleon on learning that a
commentary on his code was soon to appear, exclaim, "My code
is lost"? His anticipations were in a large degree well founded.
A distinguished French judge declared in Paris: "No judge today in 1904, not even the presiding one in the High Court of
Cassation, would say that his sole duty is to examine persistently
as to what is the meaning which a hundred years ago the
framers of the code attached to this or that article. He ought to
say that in the presence of all the changes which during the nineteenth century have taken place in the ideas, institutions, economic conditions and social status of France, justice and reason
command a liberal and humane adaptation of the text to the
realities and requirements of modem life."
Doubtless, wherever we might go throughout the history
of lawgiving, we should find the lawgiver colliding with the judge;
for time will keep turning up new combinations, at least new
to that lawgiver and to those administering his rules. The new
point must be passed upon; and when that is done, something
will have been added to the rule or taken from its possibilities.
For the next case will under any system, or all of them, be considered not merely in the light of that rule, but in that of the
former application of it as well.
Why, indeed, should the case of two parties litigating over
railroad rates be settled, or why should any attempt be made
to settle it, by a clause of Napoleon's code published before
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Stephenson's locomotive was so much as thought of? The
truth is that genuine justice is deaf as well as blind. She neither
sees with her own eyes nor hears with her own ears, but with
those of the parties before her. It is not a question of what codedrafters or precedent-makers of preceding centuries who had
neither knowledge nor anticipation of these parties or of their
situation, thought or intended. The question in reference to
codes or precedents, which justice asks, is, what did these parties
at the time of the transaction out of which the dispute comes,
fairly and reasonably understand and expect from those provisions and precedents and the situation as modified by them?
If justice and its ministers are to have any respect among live
and thinking men, that is the question which they must answer.
That the answer is liable to be something startlingly unlike
what was in the original lawgiver's mind, is a simple result of
the eternal flux of sublunary things.
" Time like an ever rolling stream
Sweeps all its sons away."

Let us hope and believe that it brings better in their places.
That the unintended consequences of any considerable social
adjustment are much more important than the intended ones,
is one of the commonest of commonplaces. Beyond all doubt
it will remain so, as long as in those matters about which men
concern themselves, the portion which can be definitely foreseen
and controlled is small, compared with that which cannot.
Witness the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution.
Observation of results from the income-tax provision, and from
that for popular election of senators, in our new sixteenth and
seventeenth ones, gives a fresh interest to existence. Indeed,
the difficulty of the judge's task of clearly apprehending the
changes which time has already made in former legal conceptions
and relations ought effectually to deter him from trying to
introduce any of his own.
An accentuation of the difficulty which has always beset the
legislator arises when his countrymen have for ages lived under
a system derived from the judicial application, adaptation, and
supplementing of spontaneous customs with small interference
of the legislator so that the doctrine that precedent makes law
is thoroughly wrought into the social fabric. When to this is
added the crowning judicial authority. to declare legislative
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enactments unconstitutional, the modern legislator who wants
to enact laws, some of which are in fact infringetpents upon
constitutional provisions, takes not to the woods, as the authors
of The Federalist and the other constitution-makers seem to
have intended and expected, but to the referendum.
Those who cite constitutions and decisions are taken at their
word. Their adherence to the letter of the constitution is "not
putting courts above legislatures, but merely putting the people
above both." Very well, let us have the people's own say-so
as to whether or not these changes shall be made. The referendum and the initiative are a well-planned effort to develop a
legislative force that shall not be shackled by constitutional
restrictions. This modem legislator is even more impatient
of the judicial curb than have been his predecessors, but he is
bound to feel it, and his work, too, will go into the judicial
hopper.
In truth, his own advantages and energy are augmented as
compared with those of his predecessors even more than the
judicial opposition has been strengthened. If de Tocqueville
were still alive, his "sort of religious terror" at the irresistible
advance of democracy and at the way in which every discovery
and invention, from that of gunpowder to the telephone, help
it on, would certainly be deepened. Social consequences, as
distinguished from the material and the intellectual ones, of
those discoveries are only beginning to show themselves, and
they are giving the legislator his opportunity and responsibility.
He is at outs with the constitutions along two main lines.
Those constitutions are framed upon the basis of a civil law that
recognised a natural right of property which was not derived
from government and which government itself was bound to
respect. They were based upon the idea of a criminal law
which was set up to preserve the public peace, King's peace it
had been, as a substitute and satisfaction for personal vengeance
for wrongs. Its fundamental conception was retribution upon
the wrong-doer. The conception and feeling under both civil
and criminal law and its administration have changed. Both
are now justified on the basis of social necessity and welfare.
The basis of property is no longer, if it ever was, the one
which Adam Smith adopted, the individual's right to himself and
to the product of his own activities. Rather it is prior legitimate
possession admitted and upheld for the good of society. The
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modem legislator wishes to modify in many ways the legal
status of property and finds the constitutions and the courts
in his way.
In 1893 Congress enacted an income tax. A similar one had
been laid during the civil war and upheld. The'federal court,
however, changed its ruling and held the law bad because it
proVided for a direct tax and was not apportioned as federal
direct taxes are required to be. The sovereign people thought
that the decision was unduly influenced by the fact that small
incomes were exempt and by fear of further steps towards throwing the burden of taxation upon large incomes. The dread
popular sovereign, whose slumber Dicey said it took the cannon
of the civil war to break, came forth and wiped off the decision
by means of the sixteenth amendment to the federal constitution.
He can almost be heard from Washington asking the judges if
the income tax in the new tariff bill is not beyond their reach.
The ground for complaints of excessive interference by the
courts in the domain of legislation is thus explained in part, at
all events, by the qualities of human nature which in all times
and all countries have produced legal tribunals and induced
their activity and did so long before like qualities developed formal legislation. In part such interferences are due to the special
characteristics of a judge-fqunded, if not a judge-made system,
where precedent has the f011ce of law, a system in which a great
judge was able to say with applause instead of rebuke, "I
recognise nothing as an authority in the law except such a case
so decided," a system in which the introduction at a political
crisis of written constitutions attempting to set the courts wholly
apart from legislative activity was only an occasion for a further
extension of the powers of the tribunals. Made by those constitutions a co-ordinate branch of the government, they were
bidden by the prevailing individualism to enforce the guaranties
of private rights in the same constitutions and to declare void
any legislation infringing them.
Then came the shifting of public sentiment in both the domain
of property rights and that of criminal justice; and it would seem
that the discontent with lawyers and courts who naturally
continue on the old course until it reaches an impasse is pretty
well explained.
Nevertheless something more remains to be said . . . . Once
upon a time a social party of guests fell to talking of personal
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appearance as exhibiting age. One of them with a tacit claim
of youth, gave a number of explanatory circumstances to account
for the visible marks of wear in his case. His recital of special
hardships, trying employments, anxiety, and sickness, seemed
fully to account for his condition till one of the others impolitely
asked: "Have n't you left out one important reason for your
agingappearance?" "I think not. What one?" "Why, the
fact that you are pretty blessed old."
It is possible, notwithstanding the many other good means
of accounting for tlie complaints about the courts' presence in
the field of legislation, that they may have sometimes been
there unwarrantably. As to this, let a few additional facts be
submitted to a not always candid world.
In 1819 came up in the United States Supreme Court the
question of the right of the state of Ivlaryland to put a special
stamp tax on the notes taken within its boundaries by a branch
of the Bank of the United States. This bank had a branch
making loans and taking deposits in Baltimore. A state law
required all banks not chartered by Maryland to put a state
treasury stamp upon every note taken. This was aimed at the
United States bank. The latter's manager, McCulloch, disregarded such requirement and was sued for the penalty. The
state court assessed that penalty upon him. The State Supreme
Court affirmed it and he appealed to the United States Supreme
Court in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland. It was held not
merely that this special requirement of a tax not laid upon the
Maryland banks was bad, but that ~faryland could not tax
the United States bank at all.
When the present system of national banks was organised
Congress found this rule established and provided that such
banks should pay the same taxes to state and local authorities
as should be assessed upon other similar property in the localities.
This provision was held to be constitutional. That is, there
was no constitutional difficulty in the way of making a United
States corporation, voluntarily locating itself and its business
within a state, pay its share of local taxes. Only the consent
of Congress to such taxation must be first obtained. Of course,
if Congress had authority to incorporate the bank, it could adjust
the terms; but state and national governments were intended
to work together and surely there could be no good reason for
freeing these national corporations from local taxes, unless it
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was expressly so provided as in the case of national bonds or
other United States securities.
A fear that Congress would not adequately protect national
corporations from state legislation is the only rational ground
for stretching the constitution so as to make it impliedly forbid
such taxation by the states. Similar provisions in the constitution of the Australian commonwealth were, on the authority
of our decision, held by the Supreme Court of the commonwealth
to exempt the salary of a post-office official from state tax at
Melbourne, but on appeal to the Privy Council that great court
promptly held that McCulloch v. Maryland was not a good
precedent, and that as long as no special exaction was made, the
commonwealth official should pay his income tax with other
people. In other words, the Privy Council found that the commonwealth Supreme Court, as well as our own, had legislated
an exemption to the federal officer instead of applying the
constitution.
In 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden, the United States Supreme
Court was called upon to say whether the Fulton and Livingston
franchise for the exclusive steam navigation of New York waters,
granted to them under nearly a dozen acts of the New York
legislature, empowered their assignee, Ogden, to enjoin Gibbons
from running his steamship from Elizabeth, New Jersey, into
New York harbour. Gibbons had a coaster's license under
federal law to make such trips. Chancellor Kent held that
New York had the right to make any regulations of New York
waters that it pleased, so long as they did not contravene any
regulation by Congress, and also held that the coasting license
was a mere permission on the part of the United States to make
the voyage without any interference on the part of the federal
government, and gave no rights as against the New York franchise. His brave language does not, however, conceal his uncertainty on this latter point. He granted the injunction.
On Gibbons' appeal Chief Justice 1\larshall found that the
Fulton exclusive franchise was inconsistent with the congressional provision for coasting licenses and as the power of Congress
over interstate navigation was admittedly supreme, he dissolved
the injunction on this ground. He says, however, that there is
great force in the argument that the constitution alone, in granting to the federal Congress power to regulate, excludes, without
any action by Congress, all direct action upon interstate or
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foreign commerce by the states; and he adds, "the court is not
satisfied that it has been refuted." The case on this basis is
constantly cited as holding that the constitution of itself precludes the states from regulations affecting commerce. Marshall
seems to have intended it should.
Meanwhile the opinion itself recognises that no important
police regulation can be adopted by any state without liability
of affecting foreign and interstate commerce. Indeed, the whole
function of policing such commerce is primarily thrown on the
state within which it occurs, as well as is the duty to provide
against the endangering through such commerce of the safety
of the community. Over the wholly internal transactions of
the people of the state, the federal government has no authority.
Over the purely foreign and interstate commerce, the state on
this doctrine has none. But such commerce carried on within
a state consists precisely in the foreign article or person entering
into relations with native articles and persons. These latter
cannot be subjected to local authority, while the commerce is
going on, without affecting the former. There you have the
situation. What is the remedy? l\ianifestly and simply, to
make the authority of the two governments concurrent and make
the national one supreme if they conflict.
This is the practical solution in commercial matters as it was
in taxation. The doctrine of exclusive regulatory power in
Congress has established a neutral zone wherein there can be no
effective legislation except by identical exactments by both
state and federal governments, as in the case of the pure food
laws. Chancellor Kent in Ogden v. Gibbons expressed the belief
that not only the language but the purpose of the federal constitution was satisfied by holding the power of the state unimpaired
except where Congress had acted. In case of any really injurious
action by any state the complete remedy was in the hands of
Congress. Not the paralysing of the state, but supremacy in
Congress if they clash, was all that was called for.
In 1888 the state of Iowa had in force a law forbidding the
sale of malt liquors. A. J. Hardin, a constable at Keokuk,
seized some barrels and cases of beer in that town which Gus
Leisy & Co., of Peoria, had sent there under charge of an agent
for sale. Leisy & Co. brought suit for their beer and got judgment for it on the ground that the Iowa law under which it had
been seized was unconstitutional. Hardin appealed to the

144

THE MID-WEST QUARTERLY

Supreme Court of his state which rendered judgment in his
favour, and Leisy & Co. appealed from this to the federal Supreme Court. That court held that Leisy & Co. were engaged
in interstate commerce with which Iowa could not interfere. It
set aside Hardin's judgment and reinstated the first one in favour
of Leisy&Co. Again, as in the taxation matter, Congress upheld
the state's action. It provided in the Wilson act of 1891 that
anyone, taking liquors into a state, shall be liable to state
laws as soon as the liquors are offered for sale. The judicial
extension converting a grant of authority into one of exclusive
authority, was not found to work well.
Of course, there was more litigation. The liquor-sellers and
their lawyers were prompt in urging that if the respective fields
of authority of the states and of Congress were fixed in the constitution, and the states excluded by it, Congress could not let
them in. Judge Marshall, however, had remarked that Congress
could adopt state legislation. It was concluded that this could
be done in advance. The liquor-dealers' contention was therefore
not upheld.
Unquestionably a leading, if not the leading motive to the
adoption of the federal constitution, was the clearing of commerce
from the burden of troublesome restrictions by the states; but
it is at least equally true that the intention was to leave the
authority of the states in all respects as little impaired as possible.
Prohibitions are somewhat liberally applied to the states in
Section 10 of Art. 1. of the federal constitution and elsewhere
with none as to this regulating of commerce. The clause itself
which makes acts of Congress supreme refers to and anticipates
state legislation. I t would seem that the critics of the courts
have some ground for saying that this whole line of decisions
and the practical troubles over them grow out of anxiety lest
Congress would not by proper legislation maintain the free intercourse between the states, and out of a more or less conscious
determination of the court to do so itself. In all of these great
constitutional cases, the doing of the true work of a court, the
securing of genuine justice for the particular parties before it,
seems to have been the least of its concerns.
Into the turbid waters stirred up by the Dred Scott case, it
is not worth our while to go. There is not space here for leaving
even a new misunderstanding. That case and the fate of the
great judge who contributed the most to it ought to be a sufficient
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warning against conscious attempts on the part of the tribunals
of justice to effect political adjustments. How about the relative
importance of foreseen and of unanticipated results in that case?
How much concern was there in the minds of either the concurring or the dissenting judges as to Scott's own fate? The incometax cases have been mentioned. Others might be, if space
permitted.
What has been said might lead to the conclusion that the
federal courts have been especially notable for pushing into the
legislator's field. Nothing of the kind is intended or would be
justified. The United States Supreme Court, having to apply
a new constitution and aid in establishing a new polity by means
of a judicial authority new in the world, was necessarily drawn
towards, if not into, political questions. The state courts have
been as much so with far less ground, or excuse, if we take the
condemnatory view. If political discussions in this country, as
has been often remarked, take on the legal form, for instance the
constitutional right to take slaves into the territories, judicial
opinions too often become a mere consideration of consequences
to flow from the precedent which will result from the decision.
In truth, the difficulty, under such a system, of getting a
tolerable regard for the rights and interests of the individual
litigants within any reasonable time, is one of the main grounds
of complaint. The remedy seems to be plain. Make in this
country as distinct a separation between the administration of
justice to individuals, based on their past transactions, and the
political adjustment of affairs for the future, as has been secured
in England, and we may hope for good sense, honesty, and public
spirit enough to exhibit at least an equal degree of success in our
own courts. In that event the arrival of the popular sovereign
with the initiative and the referendum to take politics and legislation in some degree out of the tribunals of justice, will certainly
not prove an unmixed evil.
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